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Abstract 
In this article I maintain that until the mid Seventies the regions of the Italian 
Mezzogiorno have followed a well-known path of divergence and convergence – a 
pattern in common with many other similar cases. The main characteristic of the 
Mezzogiorno’s case, however, is that the convergence phase has led the area to a 
remarkably unfavourable steady-state. Further, I suggest that the disappointing 
results obtained in the area by several and richly financed public policies – and the 
high persistence of the unfavourable steady-state – are partly due to the lower-
quality institutions in the southern regions. In the second part of the article I discuss 
recent contributions that associate this failure of local institutions to the scarcity of 
social capital, and that explain the persistence of this scarcity assuming the existence 
of mechanisms of intergenerational transmission of values and norms that change 
very slowly in time. Finally, in the final part I discuss briefly the role of economic 
policy in the presence of mechanisms of this nature. 
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1 In writing this article I benefitted from from several discussions on the 
Mezzogiorno’s case I had with Fabrizio Barca, Luigi Cannari, Maria Rosaria 
Carillo, Adriana Di Liberto, Raffaele Paci, Guido Pellegrini and Fabiano 
Schivardi. Special thanks to Anna Giunta for the frequent and for me very 
useful conversations about the causes of the Mezzogiorno gap and the policies 
adopted so far. Finally, I thank Massimo Carboni of CRENoS for excellent 
research assistance. The research leading to this article has received funding 
from the European Community's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-
2013) under grant agreement n° 216813. 
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1. Theories, facts, questions 
To put the economic issue of the Mezzogiorno in a more general 
framework, it is convenient to start from the famous prediction of an 
economist who has done much to revive the theory of growth. Lucas 
argues, in an article about what will happen in the 21st century (Lucas, 
2000), that before the Industrial Revolution, differences in per capita 
GDP between countries were very limited, everybody was equally poor. 
The industrial revolution upsets this scenario because it creates a 
technological opportunity that, for many, not always well understood 
reasons, some can take before than others. Thus a phase of divergence 
begins: some countries grow rapidly, others remain stationary. However, 
given the technological nature of this growth, and given the strong 
positive externalities associated with technology, divergence is not a 
long-term fate. Indeed, it is the prerequisite for convergence, with the 
latter being the state towards which the whole system moves. In the end 
the backward economies catch up with the early starters, and the 
measurs of inequality goes back to zero after having formed a classic 
inverted U-curve. 
A similar idea - the one that market forces are sufficient to generate 
absolute convergence - also appears in other articles at the center of the 
revival of the theory of growth of the 80s and 90s of the last century. For 
instance, after analyzing the period 1950-1985 Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
conclude that "there is nothing surprising in the relative performances of 
the regions of northern and southern Italy. The south of Italy has not yet 
caught up because it started far behind the north, and the rate of 
convergence is only about 2 percent a year (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
1991, p. 151). 
It is difficult not to think of these predictions while inspecting Figure 1, 
due to Daniele and Malanima, which describes the Mezzogiorno’s gap in 
gross domestic product per capita between 1861 and 2004 (Daniele and 
Malanima, 2007, p. 289). 
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Fig. 1. Mezzogiorno’s per capita GDP, 1860-2004 (center-north=1). 
 
Source: Daniele and Malanima (2007) 
 
The beginning of the long line represented in Figure 1 is perfectly 
consistent with the Lucas story: uniformity in the pre-industrial poverty. 
Even large parts of the subsequent path retrace the steps defined by 
Lucas: a long divergence phase, which enlarges the gap between those 
who were able to create the manufacturing and those who did not. This 
long period of divergence ends in 1951, when the GDP per capita in the 
south is only 47% of that of the rest of Italy.  
In 1951 starts a major process of convergence – here too, in line with the 
model of Lucas. The positive phase continues until the first half of the 
70s, when the indicator reaches 66-67%, with a gain of about one 
percentage point per year.  
As is evident from the graph, here the Lucas’story stops and the 
dynamics of the economic relationship between the south and the rest of 
the country enters its peculiar path, one in which the gap does not 
decline constantly (as Lucas predicts) but instead stays roughly constant 
around 60% -- a rather uncomfortable level.  
The chart in Figure 1 also explains the misplaced optimism of Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin. Their analysis focuses on 1950-1985, the only phase 
dominated by strong convergence. Projected into the future, that phase 
provided a positive scenario that was never realized. 
What is the reason for the this persistent break in the process of 
convergence? Is it an accident or is the signal of a persistent mechanisms 
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that makes it difficult for the Mezzogiorno to overcome a gap of 40 
percentage points? Are there similar cases in other countries? And if the 
gap is persistent, what are the determinants of this persistence? To these 
questions are dedicated the pages that follow. 
 
2. Steady state 
Anyone who has been exposed to the debate on the theory of 
economic growth of the past two decades, in the graph of Daniele and 
Malanima sees a familiar story: the story of conditional convergence.  
Convergence, therefore, but with a limit value in which a large gap can 
emerge.  
The south is really in such a negative steady-state? A clear answer is not 
easy: what can be done is to use the data we have to assess this 
possibility.  
In our case, the main hint comes from the observation of what has 
happened elsewhere. This piece of evidence is provided by Temple 
(2001), who identifies the period 1950-1973 as the "Golden Age" of 
Europe. Those are years in which Europe as a whole grew at rates never 
achieved in the following decades. For Temple, this was made possible 
by a deep structural change that has led, in those years, many workers of 
an often poor agriculture towards higher productivity sectors. Once the 
physiological dimension of the agricultural sector is reached, maintains 
Temple, "the TFP bonus of structural change" has effectively exhausted 
its potential and this has resulted in overall reduction of growth rates. 
Convergence is clearly part of this story: the poorest economies are those 
where more labor is allocated in a sector characterized by low 
productivity and therefore have greater opportunities to exploit the 
“TFP bonus”and to grow faster in the transition to the steady state. In 
terms of countries, this is evident in the data of Temple: the European 
nations in which the size of the agricultural sector was larger in 1950 
(primarily Italy) have increased particularly fast in the next two decades, 
converging in this way towards the European average in productivity. 
Temple does not explicitly analyze the regional dimension of this 
phenomenon, but the evidence that a similar mechanism has also worked 
within countries does exist and is a robust one (for Italy, Paci and 
Pigliaru, 1999; similar evidence also exists for US: Caselli and Coleman, 
2001).  
Therefore, the convergence of the Mezzogiorno between 1950 and 1975 
coincides with the action of a mechanism which covered much of 
Europe and which benefits the poorest areas more than proportionally. 
5 
 
Exhausted this "agricultural bonus", there seems to emerge a steady-state 
such as the one suggested above. The characteristics of the latter are 
analysed in the next paragraph. 
 
3. Size and the persistence of the gap 
To obtain a better description of the size and the persistence of the 
gap, it is useful to use the most updated data available and, above all, to 
compare the Italian situation with that of other countries with similar 
problems. Recent Istat data add three years (2005-2007) to those shown 
in Figure 1. The most recent years do not change the scenario: in 2006-
2007 the area has a gap from the rest of the country of around 41 
percentage points, an improvement of about 10 points on the minimum 
level reached in the early 50's, and a decline of about 10 points on the 
best result achieved in the second half of the 70s, at the end of the 
"golden age" of convergence. 
Can we really speak of a significant and persistent gap? If important and 
persistent means something that is rarely observed in terms of size and 
duration, the answer is yes. This point is shows very effectively in a 
recent work Iuzzolino (2009). Analyzing the data of 147 regions in 14 
countries between 1955 and 2005, Iuzzolino shows the uniqueness of the 
Italian case: in 1955 in six countries out of 14 a share of the population 
above 2% was living in regions with a per capita GDP equal or less than 
65% of the national average. Among these six nations, Italy has the most 
negative value, 25.5%, followed by Spain with 11, 7%. Fifty years later, 
only one nation, Italy, has regions (and the corresponding population) 
below that threshold. Not only that: the proportion of the population 
included in the subset >65% increased compared to 1955: it now 
amounts to 28.8%.  
By changing the threshold of reference, the scenario does not change. 
The Italian case is unique for the magnitude of the gap between the 
poorest areas and the rest of the country, for the size of the population 
living in regions with a large gap, for the persistence in time of the gap 
and of the high percentage of the population involved.  
Further information can be obtained from a direct comparison between 
the pattern of regional differences in the two European countries most 
affected by the phenomenon, Italy and Spain. According to Eurostat 
(2009) data, while the Italian gap oscillates around 60% between 1995 
and 2006, the Spanish one is within the 72-75% range: if the Spanish gap 
is also a steady-state, is a very different one. 
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4. Mezzogiorno? 
There is a broad current of thought that challenges the very idea of 
“Mezzogiorno” and maintains that the analysis should focus instead on 
individual regions. The idea is that the differences across the southern 
regions dominate those between the south as a whole and the rest of the 
country. Is it really so? Figure 2 shows the position of each southern 
regions relative to the rest of the country in two distinct periods, 1982-
1994 and 1995-2007. The first period is measured on the horizontal axis. 
The bisector is the set of points along which the relative position does 
not change in passing from one subperiod to the other. The graph shows 
both the regional gaps and their dynamics. As for levels, excluding the 
Abruzzo, the average gap of which in the two periods is around 75%, the 
regions of the south barely reach 65-67% (Sardinia and Molise), with 
four of them below 60% (Calabria, Puglia and Campania in both 
subperiods, Sicily in the second, first in Basilicata). In summary, with the 
exception of Abruzzo, the maximum difference between the regions of 
the south is about 10%, while the minimum difference between them 
and the rest of the country’s average is over 30%. For sure, within the 
south there is an important divide: that between the regions with 
organized crime and the others. It a difference that seems to account for 
10 percentage points, and that should not be underestimated. But even 
areas where organized crime is not an issue lag far behind the rest of 
Italy, and this strongly suggest that abandoning the idea of 
"Mezzogiorno" might be wrong. 
Now the dynamics. Figure 2 makes clear that most regions (five out of 
eight) have grown less than the center-north, a feature that explains the 
lack of convergence of the south as a whole; that (Molise) kept its 
starting position over time; that two regions (Calabria and Basilicata) 
have gained ground against the rest of the country.  
Most importantly for us is that the two best performing regions are the 
poorer ones. Thus, the dispersion in the south has declined over time: if it 
made sense to speak of the Mezzogiorno a few years ago, perhaps it 
makes even more sense now. 
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Fig. 2. Per capita GDP, southern rehgions, 1982-1994 1995-2007 
(center-north=100). 
 
Source: our computation on Istat (2005, 2008) data. 
 
The evolution of the regional dispersion in the south, and the 
comparison with a similar indicator for the Center-north, are shown in 
Figure 3. In particular, the figure shows the evolution of the standard 
deviation of the logarithm of per capita GDP for the following areas: 
Central North (plus Abruzzo), southern Italy (Abruzzo excluded), 
southern Italy.  
Thus, the dispersion in the south is lower than in the center-north (more 
on this in a moment) and shows a decreasing trend, as it was easy to 
guess from Figure 2.  
If we used the traditional definition of the south and reallocated the 
Abruzzo, the curve of the center-north would intersect that of the south 
in 1994; from then on, the absolute value of the index would be similar 
in the two areas. 
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Fig. 3. Standard deviation of the logs of regional per capita, 1982-2007. 
 
Source: our computation on Istat (2005, 2008) data. 
 
In all cases the south is now a more homogenous area than it was before, 
and its degree of heterogeneity is less than or similar to that which 
characterizes the regions of the Center-north, depending on where one 
prefers to place the case Abruzzo.  
In closing this section, it is useful to look at the labor market. As argued 
recently by Daniele and Malanima and by Iuzzolino in their articles cited 
above, the southern gap in per capita GDP has more to do with the 
capacity to absorb labor force than with the productivity of those who 
do work. The differences in the activity rate calculated on the population 
of working age (15-64 years) are indeed very large: in 2008, on average, 
the activity rate was at 69% in the Center-north and 52% in the 
Mezzogiorno. As is inevitable, there exists heterogeneity across the 
southern regions: again, Abruzzo has an activity rate (63%) closer to the 
Center-north (67%) than to the southern average. Across the other 
southern regions there is a clear division, with Molise, Basilicata and 
Sardinia between 55 and 59 percent, and Campania, Puglia, Calabria and 
Sicily between 52 and 49 percent (Istat, 2009). Important internal 
differences that however keep all the southern regions - with the 
exception of Abruzzo - separated by at least ten percentage points from 
the average of the Center-north.  
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Speaking of the labor market, it is useful to recall that the suspension of 
the process of convergence coincided with the political decision to 
eliminate the institutional arrangements that allowed wages to differ 
across regions, an event that led to a sharp deterioration in 
competitiveness for southern companies (Boltho et al., 1999; Iuzzolino, 
2009). While it is possible that this factor contributed to cause the high 
level of the Mezzogiorno gap, its negative impact is likely to have been 
partially offset by the large amount of public money transferred to the 
southern regions to compensate local firms for the "negative 
externalities" of the area. On this more in the next section. 
 
5. Insufficient public money? 
In the preceding pages I have argued that the south finds itself in a 
steady-state of a surprising size for an advanced country. By definition, a 
stationary state implies a form of invariance with respect to actions taken 
to improve it, provided that such measures are actually implemented.  
In this section I reviews some recent quantitative assessments of the 
financial effort undertaken by the Italian state to support the 
development of the lagging regions.  
I start with analyses in which the Mezzogiorno’s case is compared with 
data from other countries with important regional differences. A 
comparison of this kind is proposed in Iuzzolino (2009). The indicator 
used is the ratio of the net income available to families to their primary 
income, which provides a measure of the net public contribution to the 
disposable income of the area "(p. 17). When comparing the indicator of 
the lagging regions with that of the other regions, the ratio turns out to 
be equal to 112 for Italy against an average of 111 for all countries.2 The 
conclusion is that "the net transfer of resources from advanced areas to 
lagging ones ... in Italy is not lower than in the average European country 
characterized by the presence of regional gaps" (p. 18).  
It is now useful to ask whether that transfer of resources in favour of the 
south is sufficient or not to generate in the area a level of per capita 
public expenditure at least equal to that of other regions. The most 
recent answer to this question is in an article by Staderini and Vadalà 
(2009), who estimated the regional "fiscal residual" for 2004-2006. In 
their calculations, public spending per capita in the south is 90% of that 
in the rest of the country. However, the 10% gap is largely attributable to 
                                                            
2  The countries included in the study are: Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, 
Greece, Italy, Portugal, Great Britain. 
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factors that are not under the direct control of the policy-maker, because 
they reflect structural differences of the territories, for instance 
differences in the age composition of the population. Net of these 
factors, the primary expenditure in the south exceeded that of Nord and 
turns out to be close to the national average (96%). 
To get an idea of the cash flows below this relative uniformity of primary 
expenditure across regions characterized by very different income levels, 
one can compare the data on regional expenditures with that on regional 
tax revenues. On average, over the period 2004-2006, the southern per 
capita revenues amounted to 53% of revenue of the Center-north. The 
amount of transfers from richer regions to the south was, in those years, 
around 16% of the GDP of the southern regions, and 5% of the GDP 
of the Center-north. 3 
Speaking of economic backwardness and its persistence, it is more 
interesting to focus on capital expenditure, whose main role is to fund 
investment to support economic development. Again, we start from a 
comparison with Spain. Comparing the Italian and Spanish capital 
expenditure for the regions lagging behind, Iuzzolino (2009) finds that 
the Italian expenditure is systematically higher.  
Regarding the constancy over time of the financial effort for the 
development of the Mezzogiorno, Cannari, Magnani and Pellegrini 
(2009) analyze the additional expenditure for the area (Structural Funds 
and FAS) as a percentage of national GDP between 1999 and 2006. In 
their analysis, the public intervention in the regions around this time is in 
line with the expenditure that characterized the “intervento 
straordinario” of in previous decades. Indeed, their index is 0.77% on 
average between 1999 and 2006, and 0.72% between 1951 and 1989.  
Finally, the dataset Conti Pubblici Territoriali (CPT) developed by the 
DPS (DPS, 2007) show that in 2000-2006 the average public expenditure 
for capital formation in the south was equal to 111% of that in the rest 
of the country.  
This evidence describe a situation in which major resources have been 
steadily transferred to the southern regions, with orders of magnitude 
similar to those found in other countries with important regional 
problems. Indeed, the prevailing view today is that the disappointing 
results we still see in the south are due to the quality of the public 
intervention, more than to the quantity of the resources involved. 
 
                                                            
3  My computations based on Staderini and Vadalà (2009), Tavola 2.  
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6. Policies: poor quality? 
So, many well-financed policies were actually implemented, but with 
no satisfactory results at a macroeconomic level.  
To understand the origin of this invariance of the gap with respect to 
these policies, three explanations are possible. First, the possibility exists 
that the gap reflects structural characteristics of the southern regions that 
cannot be modified by policies; second, that the policies adopted were 
simply wrong and would have failed wherever implemented; and, third, 
that well-designed policies – i.e., policies that do work in other places – 
have failed in the Mezzogiorno because of some not well understood 
local factor. 
The assumptions that I think are interesting are the second and third. We 
start from the policies that can be regarded as wrong in general. Policies 
of this type are not rare in the long history of the Mezzogiorno. As an 
example, consider the case of the industrial investment driven by the 
public sector. They have been quite popular in the past, and even today 
many think that the arrest of convergence is at least partly due to the end 
of that kind of investment, whose aim was "to overcome unfavorable 
agglomeration economies or inadequate social capability" (Boltho, and 
Scaramozzino Carlin, 1999, p. 331), and to their replacement with "a 
sharp shift towards income maintenance flows and the recruitment of 
civil servants" (p. 332). While it is plausible that the increase in 
government current spending at the expense of capital accumulation 
does not help to improve the local  "agglomeration economies" and 
"social capability", is not in any way demonstrated that the industrial 
dirigisme of those years were able to determine permanent improvements 
in those factors. In fact, the opposite might be true. As we have seen, 
part of the positive phase of convergence, certainly helped by that kind 
of politically determined industrial investment, had already vanished in 
the years immediately after 1975; and part of that virtuous path is 
associated with a process of structural change that has created 
convergence in most of Europe, in the presence of altogether different 
regional policies. The analysis of operations such as the "forced 
industrialization" adopted in Italy is likely, therefore, to teach us much 
about the effects of myopic policies and much less on the problems that 
in the southern regions weaken the effectiveness of otherwise well-
designed policies. 4 
                                                            
4 A rigorous full assessment of the effects of the s.c. “forced industrialization” is 
not yet available in the empirical literature on the  Mezzogiorno. For a more 
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More can be learned by this latter type of policies. Here the analysis of a 
political failure can help identify the main determinants of the gap of the 
Mezzogiorno and of its persistence. To illustrate this point, I choose an 
example from Viesti (2009). In this example too we identify a problem of 
"non optimal" composition of public spending. In particular, the 
composition problem here refers to capital spending: too much of it was 
devoted to transfers to firms (in the form of incentives) and too little to 
public investment (infrastructure). This point of view is very reasonable, 
especially in light of recent impact evaluations that have shown the 
limited effectiveness of the incentives to firms5 and of the significant 
infrastructure gap that harms the competitiveness of the southern 
regions. 
However, if the problem is well known, the cause is not. Numerous 
studies have certified that there is a significant wastage in infrastructure 
spending in the south. For example, talking about public investment in 
infrastructure Golden and Picci (2005) offer an estimate of the 
"extensive graft and fraud that are especially common to public sector 
contracting in the south of Italy" (p. 38). Using a hypothesis of "standard 
costs" (national average), and controlling for geographical differences of 
various kinds, the authors measure what has actually been achieved in 
every region in the face of what would have been achieved in case of 
perfect coincidence between actual and standard costs. The authors 
interpret this difference as an index of corruption, and find out that "the 
most corrupt region [Campania] spends four times more per unit of 
public capital than the best performing areas, suggesting massive 
amounts of fraud and inefficiency have historically characterized large 
portions of the Italian peninsula"(p. 53). Not surprisingly, the lower 
indices are the ones of the southern regions and, again not surprisingly, 
these indices are strongly associated to those of Putnam on social capital 
and civicness (on this more soon). 
The inevitable suspicion is that the problem of southern Italy is not 
limited to an "exogenous" lack of infrastructure, which would be 
relatively easy to fill with adequate resources; indeed, the lack of 
infrastructure also seems to reflect a wider problem that, if not 
addressed, may continue to generate large waste of public money. 
                                                                                                                                
positive view than the one I have proposed, see Graziani (1978) and articles 
cited by him. 
5 See Cannari et al. (2009), pp. 43-46, and Bronzini and de Blasio (2006). 
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Examples like this - reasonable public policies that fail in the south - also 
abound in other fields. Education is particularly interesting. As the 
Quaderno Bianco sulla Scuola maintains, "the differences in annual spending 
(public and private) per student are not reducible to the traditional 
North-south gap, with Liguria’s expenditure similar to those of 
Campania and Puglia and Sardinia’s expenditure equal to that of Friuli-
Venezia Giulia "(Ministry of Economy, 2007, p. 92); in addition the 
number of teachers per student and per class in the south is quite similar 
to the national average. 6 In spite of this lack of north-south divide in 
terms of available resources, the results measured by the qualitative test 
OECD-Pisa reproduce the usual scenario, that of all regions of the south 
far away from the average quality of the rest of the country. 7 
A comparison with Spain is particularly interesting here. If one computes 
the percentage of students with low competence in mathematics, the 
index for the southern Italian regions is 2.3 times higher than the index 
for the rest of the country; if you make the same comparison using 
Spanish data, the relationship between the regions lagging behind and 
the others is significantly lower: 1.5.8 Again, poor quality in the provision 
of a public good seems to be a characteristic of the Mezzogiorno. 9 
In summary, in the south were adopted wrong policies, which fail 
everywhere, and other policies that seem to work better elsewhere. The 
analysis of the failure of the latter is very valuable for those who study 
the Mezzogiorno. In particular, that kind of failure suggests the existence 
of a widespread and deeply rooted problem of institutional quality – a 
problem with a significant local component.  Many other data on 
"institutional failures" in the south could be cited to support this 
conclusion. 10 
The problem of lower-quality institutions is therefore important to 
understand the persistence of the economic backwardness of the 
Mezzogiorno. 
 
 
                                                            
6  Ministero dell’Economia, 2007, Tavola A1.9, Appendice 1. 
7  See Bratti et al. (2007). 
8  My computations on Ocse-Pisa data (Ocse, 2006).   
9  Qualitative differences in education seem to matter more than quantitative 
ones in the Spain-Italy comparison. See Di Liberto (2007). 
10  For more data on the territorial institutional quality divide see Cannari, 
Magnani and Pellegrini (2009).  
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7. Institutions and culture 
The research on the determinants of persistent differences in 
institutional quality is particularly lively in recent years, mainly thanks to 
the work of Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), which provides 
an explanation of the origins of the broad diversity of formal institutions 
in the international scene. 11 However, their explanation does not give 
satisfactory answers for the case that most interests us, one in which 
differences of institutional quality emerge within nations that share the 
same formal institutions. As Tabellini (2007) points out, 
The indicators of property right protection exploited in the 
literature measure broad outcomes, that might be due to a variety of 
formal and informal features of institutions. The fact that the same 
institutions function so differently in different environments 
suggests that informal institutions play an important role. The 
judicial system works very differently in southern and Northern 
Italy, for instance, with judges taking much longer to complete 
investigations and to rule on civil cases in the south than in the 
North. Yet, the legal system and the career path for judges have 
been the same for 150 years, and the human resources available are 
also not very different. Similar evidence applies to regional 
differences in the functioning of hospitals, schools, or public 
administrations, or to moral hazard inside large private corporations 
with branches in different regions ...  These systematic differences 
in behaviour can be traced back to different regional histories. But 
why do they persist for generations, despite identical political and legal 
institutions? (p. 2, my italics). 
Therefore, further research is underway to identify what determines the 
difference in efficacy of the same formal institutions in different ares.  
A natural candidate for this role is the "culture" of the local community 
in which the formal institution acts, namely "those customary beliefs and 
values that ... social groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to 
generation" (Guiso, Patience and Zingales, 2006, p. 23).  
Indeed, differences in local culture tend to be very persistent, as shown 
by a growing empirical literature on the role of history in economic 
development. 
 
                                                            
11  For “formal institutions” here we mean institutions that defend private 
property rights against the risk of expropriation by the public sector.  See 
Acemoglu et al. (2001).  
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In particular, Tabellini (2009) and Guiso, Pazienza and Zingales (2008th) 
have thoroughly investigated the possibility that "the quality of 
government has its roots in history through cultural phenomena" 
(Tabellini, 2009, p. 263), and therefore that historical events have 
generated persistent cultural differences between European regions in 
general and between those of Italy in particular. 12 
As is well known, Guiso et al. (2008th) have directly addressed the 
problem of the Italian regional disparities by testing the main hypothesis 
advanced by Putnam (1993). According to this hypothesis, the formation 
of social capital was particularly strong and successful in the city-states 
formed between 1000 and 1300 in the center-north; city-states whose 
formation was made impossible in the south due to the presence of the 
Normans. Their empirical test provides further support to the idea that 
historically determined initial differences can have very persistent effects. 
In this context, the current lower-quality of southern institutions would 
originate in unfavorable historical events and in the existence of 
powerful mechanisms of intergenerational transmission of values and 
norms characterized by a low level of trust. 13 
Although suggestive, this reading of the origins of the Mezzogiorno’s 
economic problem has so far found an encouraging but limited empirical 
support. There is evidence of widespread malfunctioning of public 
institutions in the provision of essential public goods such as education, 
health, safety; there is evidence that even today in some southern regions 
indicators of trust and social capital are systematically lower than those 
found elsewhere in the country; there is some empirical support to the 
hypothesis that the origin of the problem dates back to distant historical 
events. 
Taken together, this fragmented, not conclusive evidence should anyway 
convince those studying the economic backwardness of the south to take 
seriously a hypothesis that in the past has often been overlooked, namely 
that the source of institutional (and economic) failure today can be due 
to a process of intergenerational transmission of a culture characterized 
                                                            
12  Exemples of causal links from remote events to current economic 
performance abound in the more recent economic literature. See Nunn (2009) 
for a survey. 
13  For an excellent discussion of “social capital” and on how to define it, see 
Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004). For them, “At the heart of the concept of social 
capital is the idea that positive externalities cannot be achieved without some 
kind of coordination, i.e., there is coordination failure” (p. 7). 
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by a low level of trust – a process in which values and behavioral norms 
change very slowly.14 
A quick look at some simple Italian regional data provides further 
confirmation of the need to evaluate more thoroughly this hypothesis: 
Figure 4 shows the good correlation (0.63) existing in the Italian regional 
data between trust and total factor productivity (TFP), with productivity 
and trust increasing together. 15 
 
Fig. 4. Italian regions: Trust and TFP 
 
Source: Trust: our computation on ESS data (2002-2004-2006); TFP: Di 
Liberto et al. (2008) 
 
A brief comparison with the Spanish regional situation yields additional 
support to the hypothesis summarized here. As we have seen, in Spain 
the economic gap between the five poorest regions and the rest of the 
                                                            
14 For an in-depth analysis of how persistent a local culture characterized by 
“limited morality” can be, see a classical study of the Barbagia community in 
central Sardinia (Pigliaru A., 1959).   
15  The trust index is based on answers to the following question included in tre 
rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS, 2002-2004-2006): “Using this card, 
generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you 
can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”. Answers range from 0 to 10 (0 
implies no trust). The index I use reflects the percantage of answers equal to or 
larger than 5. TFP data are from Di Liberto et a. (2008).  
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country is significantly smaller than in Italy. The causal chain discussed 
above suggests that this more favourable outcome must be based on 
minor inter-regional differences in trust. This is indeed what we find 
using the data of the Spanish regions involved in the ESS surveys: while 
in Spain 37% of individuals have little trust in other people both in the 
lagging regions and in the rest of the country, in Italy the people who 
show little trust amount to 52% in southern regions and to 39% in the 
rest of the country. A similar difference is also apparent when we 
consider other indicators of "social capital". As showed by Nannicini and 
Leonardi (2008), the per capita blood donations in the Mezzogiorno 
range between 50 and 60% of those collected in the rest of the country, 
while those collected in the poorest Spanish regions are about 90% of 
those collected elsewhere in Spain.  
 
8. Other hypotheses  
In summary, the hypothesis "history-culture-institutions-
performance" deserves additional and more stringent testing. Until new 
evidence becomes available, a good exercise is to ask what other 
possibilities may be proposed to explain the existence of a gap so stable 
and large. 
This is not the place neither to list in detail, nor to discuss in depth, 
other frequently debated hypotheses about the steady-state of the 
Mezzogiorno. In what remains of this section I will rather confine myself 
to point out that at least two of them seem to be more complements 
than alternatives to the hypothesis that hinges on a persistently 
inadequate endowment of "social capital". 
The first case is that of a process of convergence driven by structural 
change (Paci and Pigliaru, 1999). As noted above, the structural change 
from agriculture to sectors with higher productivity has been for a long 
period an important mechanism working in favour of the poorest 
regions. However, in some areas this mechanism has led to stationary 
states characterized by little or no regional gaps, while in others the gap 
continues to be large. Caselli and Coleman (2001) provide an explanation 
based on the role played by the development of educational 
opportunities available to the initially not qualified agricultural workers: 
more (quantity and quality of) education, more skilled workers, greater 
development of non-agricultural sectors, more increases in aggregate 
productivity. 
Again, therefore, few and poor opportunities for education reduce the 
potential for catch-up and determine the emergence of a steady-state in 
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which the gap remains large. In this setting, one wonders what can be 
the cause of an inadequate education. One possible answer was 
suggested in the previous pages: the quality of educational services 
depends (also) on the endowments of social capital. In this way is not 
difficult to imagine the role that the lack of social capital could play in 
the mechanism identified by Caselli and Coleman: less convergence 
associated with a given potential for structural change. 
A second case concerns the idea that the persistence of historical 
conditioning is explained by the impact it can have on the formation of 
institutions, regardless of the cultural characteristics of the population 
(Acemoglu, 2009). As we mentioned above, the explanatory ability of 
this hypothesis tends to decrease when switching from a cross-country 
to a cross-region (i.e. between areas that share the same formal 
institutions) analysis. In the latter case, it is difficult to exclude that the 
local culture play a role in determining widespread, persistent and 
geographically concentrated institutional failures.16 
In summary, a persistent gap requires an explanation based on 
determinants that are consistent with that feature. So far I have described 
the persistence of the gap; I have highlighted an important component (a 
widespread lack of institutional quality in the provision of essential 
public goods, and a tendency for policies to be intercepted by rent-
seekers); I have sought explanations of the coexistence of these two 
phenomena; in doing so, I have favored the recent line of research that 
incorporates Putnam’s idea that distant historical events lead to "path 
dependencies" in the accumulation of local social capital, and in which 
path dependence is explained primarily through the intergenerational 
transmission of values harmful to development. 
I have also argued that the current deficit of a strong empirical basis in 
support of this hypothesis should not lead us to neglect it, but rather to 
speed up the empirical research needed to further assess its explanatory 
power. 
Clarifying the role of the intergenerational transmission of culture in 
determining economic performances is essential in order to identify what 
kind of economic policy can support the development of the 
Mezzogiorno.  
 
 
 
                                                            
16  On this, see Acemoglu (2009), p. 123.  
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9. Economic policies for lagging behind regions  
The experience of the Italian 'new regional policy "(NPR)17 provides 
an ideal ground to show to what extent underestimating the difficulties 
of promoting social capital accumulation can make public intervention 
ineffective. 
A widely shared opinion on NPR is that its results were well below 
expectations (Barca, 2008). More controversial is the reason for this 
disappointing outcome. On this, the points of view range from the 
hypothesis that errors of diagnosis were made (Rossi, 2005); to the 
hypothesis that the policy, while correct in its design, suffered from 
inadequate resources (Viesti, 2009), or was poorly implemented (Franzini 
and Giunta, 2009), or was inadequately supported by national policies 
(Cannara, Magnani and Pellegrini, 2009) and by the political will 
expressed by the central government (Barca, 2008). 
In this article I suggests a point of view partially different from those 
cited here. To illustrate, I'll make a brief reference to the NPR’s 
diagnosis of the relative backwardness of the south. In that diagnosis, 
there are many of the elements that I mentioned in the previous sections 
of this paper: in particular, the hypothesis that the persistence of such a 
large gap, and one so clearly characterized by a poor performance of 
local institutions, may originate from an inadequate endowment of social 
capital, which, in turn, “can be attributed to the history of the area, the 
weaknesses and shortcomings of the state, the presence of practices 
detrimental to development "(Cannari et al., 2009, p. 35). 
The point therefore is to accelerate the accumulation of social capital. Is 
this possible? And if so, how? In the opinion of Cannari et al. (2009), the 
NPR’s point of view on the first question is clearly stated: in contrast 
with theories that emphasize the long-term persistence of initial 
conditions, "the NPR believes that ‘history can be changed by the 
current history ’... "(p. 35-36). This cautious optimism originates in a 
precise statement about what determines the scarcity of social capital. As 
Barca (2008) maintains, in southern societies "the lack of trustful 
relationships [is] not the result of a deficient ‘civil endowment’,  of an 
innate shortage of civicness ... but of the way in which the state has acted 
in this area. The deficit was exacerbated after the war precisely because 
of the wrong economic policy"(Barca, 2008, p. 4). The proposed solution 
is consistent with these premises: the emphasis is on encouraging the 
                                                            
17 See Cannari, Magnani and Pellegrini (2009) for a comprehensive description 
of the set of policies behind the “NPR” label. 
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development of trustful relationships, especially between the public and 
private agents, through "forms of institutional support to boost planning 
capacity in the area and the creation of groups of local actors [that] can 
actually stimulate the formation of externalities and … local 
development "(Cannari et al., 2009, p. 64). 
Let us compare this implicit idea of "accumulation function" of social 
capital to the one mentioned in the previous section, which emphasizes 
the existence of mechanisms that generate long-term persistence of 
historically determined "initial" conditions. The difference is noteworthy: 
the latter explanation is crucially based on the existence of long-standing 
inadequate endowments of civicness, and on the hypothesis that the 
persistence of this unfortunate state of affairs is due to the working of an 
intergenerational transmission of values that occurs within the family, or 
anyway within in restricted environments – values that are not easy to 
modify in the absence of targeted policies, based on a clear 
understanding of the mechanisms in action. 18 
The analysis of the main lines of action adopted by NPR confirms this 
difference in vision. At least two pieces of evidence may be cited to 
justify this assertion. The first concerns the limited role that NPR 
assigned to improving both the quantity and the quality of education in 
the south, at least in the first phase of its intervention. 19 This is an 
important clue, because education is one of the few policies able to exert 
some influence on the mechanisms of intergenerational transmission of 
cultural values (among others, Helliwell and Putnam, 2007, discuss at 
length the relationship between education and trust). 20 
Instead, the NPR has focused on trying to generate trust by encouraging 
the development of public contexts characterized "by the practice of 
sharing services, learning from errors, technological contamination, 
becoming suppliers for each other" (Cannari et al., 2009, p. 35). 
At the root of this choice there is, presumably, the idea that “clubs and 
networks can facilitate search and provide an imperfect substitute to 
generalized trust: in the absence of generalized trust, it may be necessary 
to rely on clubs and networks” (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004, pp. 14-
15). Indeed, the construction of the partnerships envisaged by NPR can 
                                                            
18  Tabellini (2008) and Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008b) are models of 
educational choices characterized by high persistence of intergenerational 
values. 
19  See Cannari et al. (2009), p. 65-66. 
20  See also Barca (2008).    
21 
 
be interpreted as a solution to the problem of “dispersed knowledge” 
analyzed by Hayek (1945) – partnerships were meant to ensure 
information exchange and to promote cooperation between different 
subjects, expanding "the range and speed of social exchange beyond the 
confines of inter-personal trust "(still Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004, p. 
12). 
For this to succeed, and for social capital of this limited nature to be 
actually generated, the public sector needs to write rules able to persuade 
the agents that the process will work out the inevitable conflicts between 
competing interests and will reduce the scope for free-riding (ib., p. 11). 
However, many studies document that the NPR was often unable to 
select and fund the projects of better quality. As Cannari et al. (2009) 
point out, in reporting the results of an investigation involving a number 
of "privileged witnesses", "the problem is that the political side always 
searches for consensus and does not manage to select priorities ... 'We 
said yes to all', says one of the interlocutors "(p. 78). When a policy fails 
to provide adequate mechanisms for (self-) selection of virtuous projects, 
contexts with low initial trust are likely to develop a kind of cooperation 
very different from the one capable of creating positive externalities, 
social capital and local development. 21 
The underestimation of this danger is the second indication that the 
NPR’s view on what determines the endowments of local social capital 
differs significantly from the “long term persistence” one. In other 
words, NPR seems to have seriously underestimated the difficulty of 
"changing the history" in the absence of specific interventions to ensure 
the provision of quality education and the systematic exclusion of "rent-
seekers' from the allocation of government funds for private projects. 
With all its mistakes, the NPR's experience is valuable for those who 
want to design new policies for the regions who are lagging behind: it 
has clearly identified the area where the action should be and – through 
its trials and errors – has provided valuable information on how to 
intervene more effectively to accelerate the formation of social capital. 
The idea that the Mezzogiorno’s gap might have to do with aspects of 
today's culture inherited from previous generations, does not mean 
surrendering to an improbable historical determinism; instead, it means 
that we have a much needed new field of research to improve our 
knowledge of the mechanisms of local accumulation of social capital and 
of what public actions are capable of accelerating the process. 
                                                            
21 For an in-depth analysis of this mechanism, see Giunta and Franzini (2009). 
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Improving this knowledge seems even more important and urgent than 
in the past. The model of fiscal federalism recently adopted by the Italian 
state does not seem to have taken in proper account the problem of the 
high heterogeneity of cross-region institutional quality. If it did, the 
approach taken was based on the conventional argument that the 
transfer of responsibility from the center to the periphery, in the 
presence of hard budget constraints, improves per se the efficiency of a 
more strictly controlled (by the territorial community) local public sector. 
The problem is that the probability that mechanisms of this type work 
decreases as regional gaps increase, especially if their origin is the viscous 
cultural components to which I referred in the preceding pages. The 
experience of the two southern regions with special constitutional status, 
Sardinia and Sicily, confirms the doubts just expressed: namely, that the 
mechanism provided by the classic fiscal federalism does not facilitate 
the convergence in institutional quality across very different regions. 
From what one can guess, if there will not be rapid progress in our 
understanding of the factors causing the persistence of the 
Mezzogiorno’s economic gap, the unfavourable steady-state that I have 
described will continue to exist for a long time yet. And if it moves, the 
risk is that it does so in the wrong direction. 
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